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Making Russia forever great: 
imperialist component  
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Abstract: The article outlines the geopolitical rationale behind contemporary 
Russian expansionism, as well as presents the asymmetric and “hybrid” mech-
anisms utilized by the Kremlin to solidify its authority in the post-communist 
space. To do this, the article refers to the findings of American, British, Polish 
and Ukrainian intellectuals on the nature of the Russian political identity. The 
four commonly used theoretical frameworks explaining contemporary Rus-
sian expansionism are described and critically assessed (imperial, diversionary, 
divergent identities and “angry guy”). Apart from this, the Russian and foreign 
political philosophic thought of the XIX-XXI centuries is referred to. The latter 
was done to trace the evolution of the Russian Byzantium-type governing tra-
dition and national identity. The article puts forward the hypothesis that Rus-
sian expansionism, alongside the Russian sentiment towards an imperialist 
worldview, are tested by historical patterns of national policy-making which 
bring the state to its civilizational glory. In this light, it will be futile to expect 
that Russia can fully democratize, build a Western type of a nation-state and 
start conducting open policies.
Keywords: Russian foreign policy, Russian political identity, Russian neo-im-
perialism, Russian expansionism
Introduction
When speaking of the recent conflicts in the post-communist space, 
one can not overlook Russian involvement behind virtually every one 
of them: Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Transnistria, South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, Adjara (unsuccessful), South Kyrgyzstan, Crimea and Don-
bas. Depending on the situation, Russian armed forces are portrayed 
as arriving as peacemakers or peacekeepers while the Kremlin often 
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denies it is one of the sides in the conflict.1 Considering the power, 
authority, and geopolitical gravity of Russia, it is no surprise that the 
state takes decisive actions in its neighbourhood. However, some of 
these measures look like parts of a farsighted expansionist strategy, 
not the precise surgical strikes aimed at a prompt pacification and se-
curing long-term peace between all sides.
This article puts forward the hypothesis that the rationale behind 
Russia’s aggressive actions in its neighbourhood resides in its goal of 
achieving certain geostrategic objectives which are largely predefined 
by the state’s imperial traditions, memories, and fears that the Krem-
lin may irretrievably lose control over lands which were once Russian. 
This especially applies to the currently sovereign entities of Central 
and Eastern Europe.
As the methodology is concerned, it will reside in combining clas-
sical and critical geopolitics. The first – state-centred Hobbesian 
geopolitics – will allow for the explanation of the nature of Russian 
expansionism in light of it seeking Lebensraum. In its turn, critical 
geopolitics will allow for the unveiling of the mechanisms which the 
Kremlin utilizes to achieve its objectives in the post-Cold War inter-
national arena. The paradox here is that the Kremlin pursues state 
interests through a utilization of mechanisms which emerged in dem-
ocratic societies to limit the state’s power (i.e. empowerment of the 
individuals and non-state actors).
The article consists of three major thematic blocks. The first block 
touches upon the nature of Russian imperialism and expansionism, as 
well as its perception by the Russian and Western academia (British, 
US, Polish and Ukrainian scholars). The second block outlines tools 
and strategies which the Kremlin utilises to achieve its desired foreign 
policy objectives in the neighbourhood. In this respect, special atten-
tion is paid to the Russia-initiated asymmetric operations and “hybrid” 
wars. The third block assesses the complexity of contemporary fac-
tors and drivers which nurture the assertive Russian foreign policy.
1 O. Kushnir, ‘Ukrainian Policies in the Black Sea Littoral: History, Current Trends, and Perspectives’, 
The Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol. 25, no. 2, 2017, p. 169; idem, Ukraine and Rus-
sian Neo-Imperialism…, p. 2.
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1. Expansionism as Russian modus operandiIt was at the beginning of the XX century that Russian philos-
ophers for the first time clearly presented and justified the ideas of 
Russian exceptionalism, expansionism, and – even – messianism. 
One may refer here to Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900) who advocated 
the idea of a Russian-led global empire built on the principles of reli-
gious Christian universalism; or to Nikolai Fedorov (1828-1903) who 
emphasized the Russian “duty” before humankind to unify the world 
through Orthodoxy and autocracy; or to Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1948) 
with his unveiling the historical and spiritual evolution of Russian Or-
thodoxy and political culture. The latter claimed that religion and au-
thoritarianism were two cornerstones of the Muscovite state, which 
later nurtured the Russian imperialistic idea, and finally provided the 
impetus to Soviet expansionism and Russian messianism.2
Over time, little has changed in Russian political philosophy. For 
instance, after the collapse of the USSR Aleksandr Dugin continued to 
perceive Russian expansionism – especially in its Eurasian dimension 
– as something natural and inescapable. He contributed to the idea of 
Russia as the Third Rome; from Dugin’s perspective, Russia finds it-
self in an eternal struggle with the global maritime Carthage, which is 
the US. One of the battlefields between these two transcendent pow-
ers is its neighbourhood. Dugin argues that Russia has no other way 
to exist except for being victorious and constantly growing Empire: 
“The whole history of Russia is the history of the construction of the 
Empire. Russia either becomes the Empire or disappears”.3 Moreo-
ver, Russia as the entity combining the true Orthodox faith with true 
political leadership should unite and lead other nations against the 
Carthage. By doing so, it will prevent the doomsday and the coming 
of the Antichrist.4
Similarly as Dugin, Nataliia Narochnitskaia also stresses the im-
portance of religion in understanding the Russian state and its histor-
2 J. Østbø, The New Third Rome. Readings of a Russian Nationalist Myth, Dissertation for the degree 
philosophiae doctor (PhD) at the University of Bergen, 2011, pp. 67-75.
3 Ibid., p. 134; А. Резчиков [A. Rezchikov], ‘Имперский марш прошел по Москве’ [Imperial march 
took place in Moscow], Взгляд [View], 8 April 2007, http://www.vz.ru/politics/2007/4/8/76422.
html [2018-08-07].
4 Østbø, op. cit., p. 143.
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ic mission. She constructs her narration on the dichotomy between 
Orthodox Russia and the Anglo-Saxon West, treating the latter as 
God-alienated and heretic. According to Narochnitskaia, the history 
of humankind is a by-product of interactions between different reli-
gious groups. Thus, it is impossible to interpret history by removing 
the spiritual element, as the West does it. Moreover, total seculariza-
tion makes the West unavoidably hostile towards Russia, which re-
mains morally superior due to its strong religious identity. As Jardar 
Østbø summarizes Narochnitskaia’s major ideas: “The Russian state’s 
expansion was for the most part in self-defence and can be justified by 
international law … [i.e. the Western view on Russia Western view on 
Russia] is stereotypical and essentially false, partly because important 
research on Russia is not objective. It is rooted in heretical and inhu-
man thought and misunderstandings and is closely related to geopoli-
tics, i.e. to the desire to conquer and annihilate Russia”.5
Apart from Soloviev, Fedorov, Berdiaev, Narochnitskaia and Dugin, 
one may find a considerable number of other Russian philosophers and 
geopoliticians who – under various justifications – support the state’s 
expansion. For instance, Alexandr Block (1852-1909), Iurii Kliuchnikov 
(1886-1938), Nikolai Trubetzkoy (1890-1938), Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954), 
Evgeny A. Korovin (1892-1964), Egor Kholmogorov, and others. Albeit 
their views may have been grounded on ambiguous deductions, one 
should not underestimate their influence on Russian foreign and do-
mestic policies, as well as on the formation of Russia’s identity.
Vadim Tsymburskii (1957-2009) can be defined as the most 
consistent anti-imperialist. He argued that Russia’s post-Cold War 
borders were finally adequate and there existed no need to project 
power onto new territories. Moreover, he condemned expansionism 
claiming that it brings more negative than positive effects, especially 
if Russia expands into Europe. Russia, according to Tsymburskii, is 
a civilizational island and should always keep its distance from the 
outer world. But this kind of isolationist geopolitical philosophy was 
rather an exception than a rule.6
5 Ibid., p. 169.
6 Ibid., pp. 97-98; В. Цымбурский [V. Tsymburskii], Остров Россия. Геополитичиские и хроно-
политические работы 1993-2006 [Island Russia. Geopolitical and khronopolitical works 1993-
2006], Москва [Moscow]: ROSSPEN, 2007, pp. 7-11.
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Addressing the Western philosophic and geopolitical views on the 
nature of the Russian state, one may hardly discover anything related 
to messianism, exceptionalism, or a “duty” before humankind. It is 
the opposite; Russia’s aggressive foreign policy is defined by many as 
an existential threat.
If one were to speak in particular of Polish geopoliticians at the be-
ginning of the XX century, one might observe that a majority of them 
were openly anti-Russian. For instance, Włodzimierz Wakar (1885-
1933) perceived the Russian Empire and later the USSR as a major foe. 
That was clearly visible in Russian advancements and the seeking for re-
vanche after World War I. Wakar supported the idea of Prometheanism 
which entailed the unification of Eastern European nations, the crea-
tion of the Intermarium block of states, and the successful resistance 
to any aggression from the East. His strategic solution resided in the 
partition of Russia and the emergence of independent nation-states.7
In his turn, Władysław Studnicki (1867-1953) also claimed that the 
major regional villain is Russia. During the XVIII and XIX centuries, 
Russia had started 38 wars which lasted summarily 128 years. This al-
lowed Russia to expand and achieve its major geopolitical objectives. 
Thus, the Eastern European states – in particular, Poland – would ac-
quire security only after the demolition of Russia. The conflict between 
Russia and the rest (or Russia and the West), according to Studnicki, 
was timeless and natural.8
Adolf Bocheński (1909-1944) considered Russia to be an artificial 
state full of disgust and moral decay. Expansionism was not the salva-
tion of humankind, but the enslavement of nonconformists. Hundreds 
of nations were experiencing constant repressions coming from central 
authorities in Moscow. In a word, the processes taking place in Russia 
and the USSR were described as barbarian, unhealthy and harmful.9
Apart from Wakar, Studnicki, and Boheński, similar views on Rus-
sia were shared by other Polish geopoliticians, statesmen and philoso-
phers, among whom one should name Ignacy Matuszewski (1891-1946), 
7 P. Eberhardt, Twórcy polskiej geopolityki [The Fathers of Polish geopolitics], Kraków: Arcana, 
2006, p. 86.
8 Ibid., pp. 111, 106.
9 Ibid., p. 138.
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Włodzimierz Bączkowski (1905-2000), Juliusz Mieroszewski (1906-
1976) and others.
British historian Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975) defined Russia as 
the permanent Byzantium-type state, regardless of the time epoch 
and political regime ruling over it. Russian leaders, the same as Byz-
antium Emperors, were considering their decisions and judgments 
always correct and indisputable. This encouraged them to rule over 
the state with totalitarian confidence; state institutions were also ap-
propriately adjusted. Bearing this in mind, Toynbee makes no distinc-
tion between tsarist Russia and the communist Soviet Union: “In this 
Byzantine totalitarian state, the church may be Christian or Marxian 
so long as it submits to being the secular government’s tool … Under 
the Hammer and Sickle, as under the Cross, Russia is still ‘Holy Rus-
sia’, and Moscow is still ‘The Third Rome’”.10
The nature of the Byzantium state, as described by Toynbee, makes 
Russia permanently hostile towards the West. These two powers are 
civilizationally incompatible. Moreover, Toynbee describes the self-
identification of Muscovites – the title nation in Russia – as chosen 
by God to protect the true faith after the fall of Constantinople and, 
eventually, to build a world empire around that true faith.11 Here one 
may make numerous allusions to Russian philosophers and geopoli-
ticians presenting Russia as the Third Rome. The difference between 
Toynbee and them, though, resides in the fact that the first neither 
sees Russian expansion as a priori constructive, nor “legitimizes” it 
from the perspective of serving the global good.
Ukrainian geopolitician Yuriy Lypa (1900-1944), when living in 
Warsaw, stressed the military aspect of the state’s expansionism: “War 
and only war was the idol of imperial rule. War could be easily started 
because the majority of the population supported it eagerly: peasants 
were waging heavy wars with the administration on their lands, that 
they were reluctant, or even looked with hope to gain new territories”.12 
10 A. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, p. 164.
11 Østbø, op. cit., p. 78.
12 Ю. Липа [Yu. Lypa], Призначеня України [Destination of Ukraine], Київ [Kyiv]: Фундація ім. 
Ольжича [Olzhych Foundation], 1997, p. 25; O. Kushnir, ‘Interwar Views on Managing Eastern Eu-
ropean Space: Exploring Lypa’s Conceptualisation of the Black Sea Union’, The Central European 
Journal of International and Security Studies, vol. 7, no. 4, 2013, p. 128.
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Lypa emphasized that Russia had always been absorbed with wars, 
either internal or external. This was possible because ordinary Rus-
sians perceive wars and armed conflicts as something natural; moreo-
ver, some of the dwellers even saw a chance to improve their personal 
well-being through conquering and looting new lands.
Finally, the US ambassador to the USSR, George F. Kennan (1904-
2005) stated the following of the Soviet Communists: “From the Rus-
sian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with 
them a scepticism to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful co-
existence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their doctrinaire ‘right-
ness’, they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing 
power”.13 As one may see, Kennan reiterates the idea of Russians per-
ceiving themselves as the “true doers” under the strong unchallenged 
leadership, which often entailed the destruction of external competi-
tive forces.
Bearing all of the above mentioned in mind, the rivalry between 
“Orthodox” Russia and the “Carthaginian” West should never come as 
a surprise; it cyclically reappears in history. Hiski Haukkala stresses that 
even if Russia tries, the principles of western governance and demo-
cratic identity cannot be incorporated genuinely into the state’s poli-
cies.14 Instead, Russian centuries old traditional expansionism seems 
to constitute a much more efficient and rational modus operandi. One 
may find the latest proof in the post-Cold War experience. Deliberate 
attempts under President Boris Yeltsin to preserve and enhance Rus-
sian geopolitical importance through democratic mechanisms were 
faulty.15 Therefore, President Vladimir Putin’s return to expansionist 
outward-looking policies was predictable; it is the return to Byzan-
13 G. Kennan, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, in: G. O. Tuathail and S. Dalby, P. Routledge (eds), The 
Geopolitics Reader, London: Routledge, 1998, p. 61.
14 H. Haukkala, ‘From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination 
of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol. 23, 
no. 1, 2015, p. 31.
15 I. Torbakov, ‘Vladimir Putin’s Imperial Anxieties’, Eurasianet.org, 9 February 2016, http://www.eura-
sianet.org/node/77256 [2018-07-03]; В. Горбулин и А. Литвиненко [V. Horbulin and A. Litvinenko], 
‘Большой сосед определился. Что Украине делать дальше?’ [The big neighbour has made up 
his mind. What Ukraine should do next?], Зеркало Недели [Mirror of the week], 18 September 
2009, http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/bolshoy_sosed_opredelilsya_chto_ukraine_delat_dalshe.
html [2015-10-25]; J. Hughes and G. Sasse, ‘Power Ideas and Conflict: Ideology, Linkage and Lev-
erage in Crimea and Chechnya’, East European Politics, vol. 32, no. 3, 2016, pp. 316, 319.
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tium roots which successfully nourished the Tsardom of Muscovy, 
Russian Empire and the USSR.
2. Features of Russian expansionist modus operandiIt will be a grave mistake to claim that Russia seeks to expand 
by any means possible. On the contrary, Russia expands because it ac-
quires the proper opportunity. This opportunity, though, may emerge 
either as a consequence of favourable circumstances or as a result of 
the Kremlin’s purposeful activities.
In 1946 Kennan wrote that Soviet foreign policy was cautious, flex-
ible, and deceptive. It was like a fluid stream which moved wherever 
it acquired space. Citing Kennan’s Long Telegram: “Soviet power … is 
neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. 
It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to the logic of reason, 
and it is highly sensitive to the logic of force. For this reason, it can 
easily withdraw – and usually does when strong resistance is encoun-
tered at any point”.16
One may find an appropriate illustration for the Soviet’s absence of 
fixed plans in its occupation of the Baltics. According to the Russian 
historian Elena Zubkova (2008), at the end of the 1930s, one of Joseph 
Stalin’s strategic objectives resided in establishing full control over 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. However, there was no clear strategy, 
as evidenced by the archives, how to accomplish this. All Stalin’s de-
cisions and actions were made ad hoc and targeted the weakest sides 
of an opponent. This approach proved to be efficient.17
On the contrary, Stalin’s highly improvisational intervention into 
Finland – the 1939-1940 Winter War – was a fiasco. Regardless of ac-
quiring new lands and moving the border further to the west from 
Leningrad, the major objective – emergence of the Soviet-controlled 
Finnish socialist state – was not met. Moreover, the casualties faced 
by the Red Army were disastrous: 126,000 soldiers dead or missing, 
188,000 soldiers severely injured, almost 2,300 tanks and armoured 
16 Kennan, op. cit., p. 62.
17 Е. Зубкова [E. Zubkova], Сталинский проект для Прибалтики [Stalin’s project for Baltic states], 
Open lecture, 2008, http://polit.ru/article/2009/01/13/pribalt/ [2016-06-28].
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vehicles destroyed.18 Since then the Kremlin did not undertake a firm 
attempt to establish control over its north-western neighbour. How-
ever, it will be wrong to conclude that the Kremlin abandoned its Finn-
ish ambitions for good.
As Russia’s benefit from favourable circumstances is concerned, 
one may refer to the inclusion of the islands Sakhalin and Amur into 
the Russian Empire. At the beginning of the XIX century, these ter-
ritories remained underpopulated and poorly explored with neither 
Russia nor China claiming authority over them. Therefore, it was 
simply an issue of setting a settlement in the Amur estuary to mark 
the whole region as Russian. This was done in 1850 and in 1853 Tsar 
Nikolay I confirmed the inclusion of the island of Sakhalin and Amur 
into the empire by stating: “Once the Russian flag is raised over it, let 
it never be lowered!”.19 Exhausted by the Opium war, China agreed 
to recognize Russian expansion through signing the Treaty of Aigun 
(1858) and the Convention of Peking (1860).
As the Russian creation of opportunities is concerned, in his 
1946 Long Telegram, Kennan also outlined the principles of Soviet 
expansion apparent in the Baltic and Finnish cases.20 He stressed that 
the Kremlin usually achieved key objectives through exerting its in-
fluence on (i) political parties in other states which openly or secret-
ly support communism and – in their unity – form some kind of the 
concealed Comintern; (ii) social leaders and opinion makers who are 
loudly promoting particular political ideas and solutions, usually rev-
olutionary; (iii) a wide variety of national associations and organiza-
tions (labor unions, youth movements, and others); (iv) international 
organizations which could interfere with the domestic policies of oth-
er states; (v) Russian Orthodox church; (vi) Pan-Slav movements and 
18 Russian Life, ‘The Forgotten Winter War’, Russian Life, vol. 57, no. 6, 2014, p. 26; R. M. Citino, ‘White 
death’, World War II, vol. 29, no. 2, 2014, p. 50.
19 O. Kushnir, ‘Russian Geopolitical Interest in the Black Sea Region: The Case of Crimea’, Athenaeum. 
Polish Political Studies, vol. 56, 2017, p. 125; В. Гелаев [V. Gelaev], ‘Где раз поднят русский флаг, 
там он спускаться не должен’ [Where Russian flag was raised once, it should never be lowered], 
газета.ru [gazeta.ru], 14 August 2015, https://www.gazeta.ru/science/2015/08/13_a_7686922.
shtml [2018-08-18].
20 G. Kennan, ‘Long Telegram (from 1946)’, Wilson Center, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/116178 [2018-08-03].
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other related movements; (vii) national governments who are ready 
to align their states to Soviet objectives.
The Soviet Union strove to create a multi-dimensional network 
of agents and proxies in target states. If one removes the communist 
component, similar modus operandi can be observed in contempo-
rary Russian foreign policies (especially as the post-communist space 
is concerned). One of the best examples here is the conspiracy be-
hind the annexation of Crimea, as it was unveiled by Taras Kuzio, 
Lada L. Roslycki, Joanna Szostek, Michał Wawrżonek and other re-
searchers.21 Another example is the Georgian war of 2008 with Russia 
using its proxies in South Ossetia to eradicate the already explosive 
situation, engage Georgia into armed conflict and then arrive as the 
peacemaker recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent 
states.22 Timothy Thomas, in his turn, points out that the Kremlin has 
also created a powerful network in the EU. In particular, he prescribes 
to this network Former Premier Silvio Berlusconi of Italy, Jean-Marie 
Le Pen, leader of France’s far-right National Front, former German 
Chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Helmut Schmidt, and many CEO’s 
of German industrial giants. Thomas defines them as Russian proxies 
– or at least sympathizers – in Europe who speak in one voice with 
the Kremlin on many issues.23 It is, though, very unlikely that Russia 
will start conducting assertive expansion into Western Europe soon.
It will be logical to conclude that Kennan in the 1950s outlined 
the principles of Soviet policies which has provided the backbone to 
contemporary Russian asymmetric or – according to some – “hybrid” 
21 For more details see T. Kuzio, ‘Russian Subversion in the Crimea’, Commentary to German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, 3 November 2006, http://www.gmfus.org/commentary/russian-sub-
version-crimea [2018-08-01]; L. L. Roslycky, ‘Russia’s Smart Power in Crimea: Sowing the Seeds of 
Trust’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, 2011, pp. 301-307; J. Szostek, ‘Russia 
and the News Media in Ukraine: A Case of “Soft Power”?’, East European Politics and Societies and 
Cultures, vol. 28, no. 3, 2014, p. 466; M. Wawrzonek, ‘Ukraine in the Grey Zone: Between “Russkiy 
Mir” and Europe’, East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, vol. 28, no. 4, 2014, pp. 760-766.
22 For more details see R. Sakwa, ‘Conspiracy Narratives as a Mode of Engagement in International 
Politics: The Case of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War’, Russian Review, vol. 71, no. 4, 2012, pp. 591-
592; Y. Sarıkaya, ‘Georgian Foreign Policy after the August 2008 War’, Journal of Black Sea Studies, 
vol. 8, no. 31, 2011, p. 4; T. Sinkkonen, ‘A Security Dilemma on the Boundary Line: an EU Perspec-
tive to Georgian-Russian Confrontation after the 2008 War’, Journal of Southeast European & Black 
Sea Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, 2011, pp. 272-274.
23 T. Thomas, ‘Russia’s Military Strategy and Ukraine: Indirect, Asymmetric – and Putin-Led’, Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 28, 2015, pp. 449-450.
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offensive operations. Thomas argues that the first type of operations 
“feature a combination of forms and methods of using forces and means 
that depend on an adversary’s unequal combat potential”.24 This in-
cludes the strategic planning of every step with significant emphasis 
made on acquiring the informational and intellectual superiority before 
any action is taken. In a word, the victory on a conventional battlefield 
is not the key objective anymore; the certain defeat of an adversary is 
not necessarily achieved through armed struggle as the informational 
environment, social architecture, and international community also 
becomes a battlefield.25 Sakwa adds to this point that the conspiracy 
narratives – searching for the hidden enemy in the black-and-white 
world – also plays one of the key roles in justifying the state’s actions.26
According to Volodymyr Horbulin, contemporary Russia is not 
conducting asymmetric operations, but waging “hybrid” wars against 
the target states. He defines the “hybrid” war as a “fuzzy” military 
conflict envisaging the implementation of non-military means which 
originally have no direct relation to classical military confrontation. 
This includes the complex and flexible nature of adversaries, utiliza-
tion of conventional and irregular means of warfare, wide-scale media 
propaganda, cyber-attacks and others.27 Some Western experts add to 
this point that the ultimate Russian goal resides in ensuring that the 
strong authoritarian leaders’ rule over key states or territories with 
their powers grounded in organized crime, GONGO’s and secret ser-
vices. All of these authoritarian leaders are accountable – directly or 
indirectly – to the Kremlin.28
24 Ibid., p. 454.
25 A. Visvizi, ‘Soft risks and threats to safety and security in the region: an overall assessment’, 
in: A. Visvizi and T. Stępniewski (eds), Poland, the Czech Republic and NATO in Fragile Security Con-
text, IESW Reports, December 2016, pp. 42-43.
26 Sakwa, op. cit., pp. 583-588.
27 В. Горбулін [V. Horbulin], ‘“Гібридна війна” як ключовий інструмент російської геостратегії 
реваншу’ [“Hybrid war” as key instrument in Russian revanche geostrategy], Дзеркало Тижня 
[Mirror of the week], 23 January 2015, http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/gibridna-viyna-yak-klyucho-
viy-instrument-rosiyskoyi-geostrategiyi-revanshu-_.html [2018-08-06].
28 B. P. Jackson, ‘The “soft war” for Europe’s East’, Policy Review, June-July 2006, http://www.hoover.
org/research/soft-war-europes-east [2018-08-06]; V. Socor, ‘Advancing Euro-Atlantic Security 
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In turn, Russian military strategists avoid the term “hybrid” war 
while addressing conflicts in their neighbourhood; instead, they re-
fer to such terms as asymmetric, non-linear, or indirect operations.29 
For instance, it was Russian Chief of General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov 
who advocated the importance of “non-linear” warfare as a comple-
ment to the military might of the modern state.30 In his article “The 
Value of Science in Foresight,” Gerasimov emphasized the following: 
“The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic 
goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power 
of force of weapons in their effectiveness”.31 He underlined that in the 
contemporary world non-military operations should occur at a rate of 
4:1 over military operations. Gerasimov also raised the importance of 
conducting surgical intelligence operations and nurturing social dis-
satisfaction within the target state to undermine the authority of lo-
cal governments in order to create a vacuum of power. Non-military 
means, especially manipulations with information, are employed to 
weaken the adversary’s military potential and disorient the indigenous 
population. Finally, “the open use of forces – often under the guise of 
peacekeeping and crisis regulation – is resorted to only at a particular 
stage, primarily for the achievement of the final success in a conflict”.32
The non-linear military strategy presented by the Russian Chief of 
General Staff became known as the Gerasimov’s Doctrine. It also has 
clear references to the 8б, 8д, 8и, and 20 provisions of the latest Mil-
itary Doctrine 2010 which – amongst others – stresses the Russian 
obligation to protect its citizens abroad.33 Being multi-dimensional, 
ruthless, planned in advance and – at the same time – highly adjust-
able, this is the strategy Russia evidently implies in order to exert its 
influence over target states. In particular, over the post-Soviet and 
post-communist states.
29 Thomas, op. cit., p. 455; V. B. Andrianov and V. V. Loyko, ‘Employment of the Russian Armed Forces 
in Critical Situations in Peacetime’, Military Thought, vol. 1, no. 24, 2015, p. 148.
30 M. Galeotti, ‘The “Gerasimov Doctrine” and Russian Non-Linear War’, Moscow’s Shadows, 6 July 
2014, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-rus-
sian-non-linear-war/ [2018-07-28].
31 В. Герасимов [V. Gerasimov], ‘Ценность науки в предвидении’ [The value of science in fore-
sight], Военно-Промышленный Курьер [Military and industrial currier], 26 February 2013, http://
vpk-news.ru/articles/14632 [2018-08-03]; Thomas, op. cit., p. 455.
32 Galeotti, op. cit.
33 Kushnir, ‘Russian Geopolitical…’, p. 118.
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3. Reasons behind Russian neo-imperialist expansionOn the example of the annexation of Crimea, Andrei Tsygankov 
defines four of the most common explanations behind Russian today’s 
assertive foreign policy.34
The first – imperial – explanation portrays Russian actions as 
a straightforward inspiration to restore the Kremlin’s rule over former 
Soviet lands. Experiencing the revival of a nationalistic narration in 
the times of Putin, Russia expands wherever it acquires the opportu-
nity and faces minimal resistance. Tsygankov claims that a significant 
number of Western researchers still “continue to interpret Russia as 
a traditionalist and expansionist power waiting to expand into for-
mer Soviet lands”.35 For instance, here one may name Horbulin who 
invented the term “revanche geostrategy” to explain Russian-led “hy-
brid” wars.36
The second explanation – diversionary – presents Russia’s aggres-
sive external actions as the Kremlin’s attempts to consolidate domestic 
power and secure internal stability. In this light, Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and its subsequent engagement into the East Ukrainian con-
flict was nothing else, but a lure to distract the attention of its citizens 
from political protests and economic troubles. One of the supporters 
of a diversionary explanation is Igor Torbakov.37
The third explanation – divergent identities – presents Russian en-
gagement into Ukrainian affairs as a retaliation to the anterior Western 
civilizational assault. Tsygankov states that the Ukrainian revolution 
of 2014 – or the EuroMaidan – came as a shock to Russian decision-
makers.38 The latter simply could not accept Ukraine’s conscious alien-
ation from the Russian “civilizational space”; they tended to perceive 
the EuroMaidan as a successful West-orchestrated operation.39 Thus, 
the Crimean annexation and later events were nothing, but an over-
34 Idem, Ukraine and Russian Neo-Imperialism…, pp. 89-92.
35 A. Tsygankov, ‘Vladimir Putin’s Last Stand: the Sources of Russia’s Ukraine Policy’, Post-Soviet Af-
fairs, vol. 31, no. 4, 2015, p. 294.
36 Горбулін, op. cit.
37 I. Torbakov, ‘What Does Russia Want?’, DGAPanalyse, vol. 1, 2011, p. 1, https://dgap.org/de/article/
getFullPDF/17753 [2018-07-03].
38 Tsygankov, op. cit., p. 296.
39 J. Darczewska, The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study, 
Warszawa: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia [Centre for Eastern Studies], no. 42, 
May 2014, p. 15.
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reaction of the “East Slavic Orthodox Civilization” on the existential 
threat to its Byzantine nature. This explanation is supported, for in-
stance, by Michał Wawrzonek.40
The fourth explanation – the so-called “angry guy” – portrays re-
cent Russian policies regarding Ukraine as Putin’s personal fury and 
outrage after the failure of his plans. Putin repeatedly stressed that the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastro-
phe of the XX century; naturally, the President of Russia was willing 
to restore the global status which his state once enjoyed, as well as to 
overcome the West’s mistreatment of Russia.41 The EuroMaidan was 
a noticeable strike in Putin’s ambitions what made him act out emo-
tionally.42 Thomas, while not exactly interpreting Putin’s decisions as 
emotional, portrays contemporary Russian actions in its neighbour-
hood as clearly “Putin-led”. According to Thomas, there would neither 
be a Crimean annexation, nor other instabilities in the post-Soviet 
space without Putin’s direct input.43
None of these reasons, though, reflect the position of Tsygankov 
on contemporary Russian policies in its neighbourhood. He inter-
prets these policies as a rational response by the Kremlin to the West’s 
growing ignorance of Russian values and national interests: “In acting 
toward Ukraine, Russia has been guided by its understanding of na-
tional interests and values, as well as the degree of their recognition by 
Western powers. The absence of such recognition has contributed to 
confrontation and violence in Ukraine”.44 Thus, aggression regarding 
Ukraine is defensive behaviour by Russia in a deteriorating interna-
tional environment caused by the unilateral and multifarious Western 
expansion into Eastern Europe. Moreover, in Putin’s view, it is also an 
issue of prestige to withstand the cultural, historical and geopolitical 
ties with Ukraine from a Western assault even if such defence breaches 
Ukraine’s sovereignty. The question of defending Russian-speaking mi-
norities from the far-right offenders in the post-revolutionary Ukraine 
40 Wawrzonek, op. cit., p. 760.
41 В. Путин [V. Putin], ‘Послание Президента Российской Федерации от 25.04.2005 г.’ [Address of 
the President of the Russian Federation from 24.04.2005], President of Russia official web-page, 
http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/36354 [2016-08-12].
42 Tsygankov, op. cit., p. 297.
43 Thomas, op. cit., p. 447.
44 Tsygankov, op. cit., p. 298.
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is also on top of Putin’s agenda. The major weak point with such a po-
sition, though, resides in Tsygankov’s sporadic perception of Ukraine 
as the subject, not the object of international relations.
Summarizing the above enlisted explanations and developing the 
Tsygankov’s perception – which is relevant in its core – the Russian 
today’s expansionist behaviour is nothing else, but the attempts to 
ensure geopolitical “justice” as Russia unilaterally sees it. The post-
Cold War history has revealed that contemporary Western liberal 
and democratic values found proper ground in the post-communist 
space. The painful and uneven, but gradual and conscious process of 
transition started in Ukraine and other states in the 1990s. Thus, it is 
incorrect to claim that the West conducted a multum of special opera-
tions, “intervened” and “enforced” democracy among millions of peo-
ple living in the newly-emerged states. The people decided to switch 
to democracy by themselves, what this meant is that the Byzantium-
type Russian model of governance lost out to its Western alternative. 
Russia – which has always favoured imperial thinking – could not ac-
cept this easily. Moreover, the accelerating transition in the post-com-
munist space looked for many in the Kremlin as a reiteration of the 
biggest catastrophe of the XX century. Thus, losing the competition, 
but not wanting to lose, Russia started to “forcefully export” its mod-
el of governance through “hybrid” wars and asymmetric operations. 
This was the best way to deal with Western-“tempted” states before 
they become irreversibly westernized. Apart from this, numerous lo-
cal conflicts were – and remain – a message to all post-communist 
states that their security and prosperity depend on the extent of their 
coherency to Russia.
In brief, regaining geopolitical influence and securing civilization-
al homogeneity – lost after the collapse of the USSR – are unilater-
ally treated by the Kremlin as a “right” and a “just” affair. Through 
conducting an expansionist foreign policy, Russia strengthens its na-
tional integrity; its leaders satisfy their personal ambitions, a wide 
range of Russian interests on different levels are met, and – finally 
– Russian Byzantium-type policies are re-confirmed as function-
al in the contemporary world. From this perspective, the political 
preferences and national interests of people living in Ukraine and 
other post-Soviet states are of minor importance. This is a typical 
neo-imperialist approach to the foreign policy-making. The West, 
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therefore, should review its understanding of Russia as a player in 
international affairs.
Conclusions
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia attempted to implement dem-
ocratic values, transparent governance, and the free market. Howev-
er, these attempts were devastating and nearly caused the partition 
of the state.45 It is no surprise, though, that the late 1990’s political 
and economic crisis evoked the restoration of the authoritarian rule 
which overlapped in time with Putin’s coming to power. This restora-
tion embraced the adoption of a refreshed Soviet national anthem, the 
proclamation of a neo-imperial course solidified by energy exports, 
semi-isolationism and spy hysteria of 2005-2007, occasional con-
frontation with the US, the proclamation of the post-Soviet region as 
a zone of Russian privileged interests, rehabilitation of Stalinist poli-
cies, and other issues.
Contemporary Russia behaves as a neo-imperial expansionist pow-
er in Central and Eastern Europe due to a mixture of reasons. Primar-
ily, it is “feeling uncomfortable” with a growing Western presence in 
what is considered to be the Russian zone of privileged interests or, 
according to Narochnitskaia, the Russian fiefdom.46 Secondly, it is 
“feeling threatened” due to the lack of efficiency of its Byzantium type 
political tradition and the successful democratic transitions of post-
-communist states. Thirdly, it is “feeling offended” in the same way as 
it felt after the collapse of the USSR when the West launched active 
cooperation with post-communist states; some of these states joined 
the EU. Which is later on considered by the Kremlin as a geopolitical 
defeat: the Cold War “balance of powers” was undermined. Fourthly, 
current Russian leaders have accumulated enough resources to “feel” 
themselves “confident” in pursuing expansionist policies regardless 
of Western condemnation. They are also securing their domestic po-
litical gravity through achieving successes on the international arena. 
45 Горбулин и Литвиненко, op. cit.
46 Н. Нарочницкая [N. Narochnitskaia], Россия и Русские в Мировой Истории [Russia and Rus-
sians in the world history], Москва [Moscow]: Международные отношения [Mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniia], 2003, p. 128.
57
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe • 16(4), 2018
Making Russia forever great: imperialist component in the Kremlin’s foreign policy
To summarize, contemporary Russian expansionism is fuelled by at-
tempts to restore historical, cultural, and geopolitical justice as the 
imperialist-thinking Kremlin perceives it.
This said, no neighbouring state is safe in the Russian game of 
thrones. Dugin points out a range of battlefields where the Third Rome 
(Russia) will fight the global Carthage (the Western World and – in 
particular – the US). These battlefields are Belarus, Eastern Ukraine, 
Moldova, Mongolia, parts of China (Siankiang, Tibet, and Manchuria), 
large areas of Central Asia, the Caucasus, Finland, and some northern 
parts of Norway and Sweden.47
Russian aggression towards its neighbours – especially the post-
communist Central and Eastern European states – is not solely 
triggered by their democratic aspirations, but by Russian strategic 
objectives and interests. Regardless of the neighbours’ political pref-
erences, Russia will aim to establish efficient supervision over them, 
either through conquest (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine) or negotiating 
unions (Belarus). Edvard Lucas states here that Russia is building a “soft 
empire” on the post-communist space solidified by secret services, 
corruption, financial inflows, economic ties and propaganda. This em-
pire should be more robust and more dangerous than the USSR; this 
empire may include more states than the USSR did.48
In a word, the expansionist and imperialist policy-making is a work-
able Russian modus operandi, tested by history, which brought the state 
(empire?) to its civilizational glory. Therefore, it would be unwise for 
the Kremlin to disregard this modus today.
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